Direktiva Europske unije o dodjeli ugovora o koncesiji i njezina primjena na ugovore u segmentu pomorskog prijevoza by Božena Bulum et al.
Zbornik PFZ, 66, (2-3) 309-333 (2016) 309
DIRECTIVE 2014/23/EU ON THE AWARD OF 
CONCESSION CONTRACTS AND ITS APPLICATION 
IN THE SHIPPING SECTOR
Božena Bulum, Ph. D. *     UDK: 347.763(4)EU
Marija Pijaca, LL. M. **    339.923:061.1>(4)EU
Marina Vokić Žužul, Ph. D. ***   Pregledni znanstveni rad
Primljeno: lipanj 2015.
In the area of the award of concession contracts there was a legal vacuum 
which European Courts tried to solve by clarifying some aspects related to the 
award of concession contracts in twenty-six pertinent judgements in that area they 
delivered since year 2000. Nevertheless, the situation in the area of the award of 
concession contracts was far from satisfactory. That alerted competent institutions 
of the European Union to the fact that problems connected with the award of con-
cession contracts can not be adequately addressed on a case-by-case basis and that 
adoption of pertinent EU rules was necessary. Consequently, at the beginning of 
the year 2014 the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the award of concession contracts was adopted (hereinafter: Concessions Directi-
ve). In this paper we are analysing the main elements of that Directive, such as 
the precise definition of concession, compulsory publication of concession notices in 
the Official Journal of the EU in prescribed cases, establishment of certain obli-
gations with respect to the selection and award criteria to be followed by entities 
awarding concessions, regulation of modifications of concessions during their term, 
etc. In the paper a critical analysis of the application of the Concessions Directive 
in the shipping sector is also made, especially in the field of award of contracts 
for the provision of maritime cabotage services and contracts on providing port 
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services, which are qualified as service concessions and, in that sense, are subject 
to the application of the Concessions Directive.
Keywords: concession contracts, Directive on the award of concession con-
tracts, maritime cabotage, contracts on providing of maritime cabotage services, 
port services, contracts on providing port services
1. INTRODUCTION
Public procurement plays a key role as one of the market-based instru-
ments for achieving smart, sustainable and inclusive growth of the European 
economy while ensuring the most efficient use of public funds. In this con-
text, concession contracts represent important instruments in the long-term 
structural development of infrastructure and strategic services, contributing 
to the progress of competition within the internal market, making it possible 
to benefit from private sector expertise and helping to achieve efficiency and 
innovation.
Concession contracts represent an important share of economic activity in 
the EU. However, the fact that Member States use different names for con-
cession contracts and the current lack of transparency concerning their award 
renders any precise measuring of their economic and social importance diffi-
cult.1 The European Commission estimates that over 60 % of all public-private 
partnership contracts in Europe can be qualified as concessions.
The impact assessment carried out by the European Commission has 
shown that absence or inadequacy of national rules for awarding concessions 
undermines the functioning of the internal market of the EU with regard to 
concessions, increases the risks of national favouritism, fraud and corruption 
in that field, and is also a source of violations of the principles of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the EU (hereinafter: TFEU).
Furthermore, the public consultation conducted by the Commission servi-
ces shows that one third of the participants (particularly private enterprises, 
associations and public authorities) were aware of cases of direct award of con-
1 For example, 6,169 concessions were advertised in the Spanish national Official 
Journal between 2006 and 2010, 817 in Italy in 2008 alone, while in France ap-
proximately 10,000 concessions are presently running. See Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the award of Concession Contracts - Frequ-
ently Asked Questions, European Commission, MEMO/11/932, Brussels, 20 Decem-
ber 2011, p. 1.
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cessions to private companies, without any transparency and without compe-
tition.2 Additionally, over the past years, a number of Member States have had 
significant infrastructure projects delayed or cancelled because of inadequate 
procedures in the award of concessions.
Finally, there is a risk of legal uncertainty related to divergent interpretati-
ons of the principles of the TFEU by national legislators, and of wide dispari-
ties among the laws of various Member States. Such risk has been confirmed 
by the extensive case law of the Court of Justice of the EU (hereinafter: CJEU) 
which has, nevertheless, only partially addressed certain aspects of the award 
of concession contracts.
The number of CJEU judgments concerning concessions is on the rise (26 
of them have been delivered since 2000). The CJEU has clarified several as-
pects related to the award of concessions and tried to address the legal vacu-
um in this area. That shows that the current situation is far from satisfactory 
and that the problems related to the award of concession contracts cannot be 
adequately addressed on a case-by-case basis.
Therefore, an adequate, balanced and flexible legal framework for the 
award of concessions would ensure effective and non-discriminatory access 
to the market to all EU economic operators, and to the citizens legal certa-
inty and the favouring of public investments in infrastructures and strategic 
services. Such a legal framework would also afford greater legal certainty to 
economic operators and could be the basis for further opening up international 
public procurement markets. Particular importance should be given to impro-
ving opportunities of access to small and medium-size enterprises on all EU 
concession markets.
2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW ON CONCESSIONS OF THE EU
In the law of the EU before the entry into force of the Concessions Directi-
ve, rules on concessions were part of public procurement directives. Directive 
2004/17/EC regulated public procurement procedures in the water, energy, 
transport and postal services sectors (utilities sector) and Directive 2004/18/
EC regulated public procurement procedures in the classic sectors (all sectors 
not covered by utilities).3 Those Directives distinguished between two types 
2 Direct award of a concession represents a serious violation of the TFEU principles.
3 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 
2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, 
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of concessions: public services concessions and public works concessions. Only 
the award of public works concessions of a value equal to or greater than € 
5 000 000 was subject to rules of Directive 2004/18/EC, while the award of 
services concessions with a cross-border interest was subject only to the ba-
sic principles of the TFEU, and in particular the principle of free movement 
of goods, freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services, as well 
as to the principles deriving from those principles, such as equal treatment, 
non-discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality and transparency. 
Accordingly, public works concessions in the utilities sector, public works con-
cessions in the classic sector of a value under € 5 000 000, and public services 
concessions in both sectors independently of their value were not regulated by 
secondary law provisions.
The absence of clear rules at the EU level governing the award of concessi-
on contracts gave rise to legal uncertainty and barriers to entry to the conce-
ssion markets of the EU.
Uncertainty with regard to the definition of concession appears already at 
the stage of qualification of a given arrangement as falling within the scope of 
the rules on public purchases. The distinction between public contracts and 
concessions on the one hand, and other types of agreements or unilateral acts 
(such as licenses and authorisation schemes) on the other hand, is unclear and 
stakeholders (e.g. in the ports sector) have reported that it is often difficult to 
know which legal regime applies to a given contract.
The current definition makes it difficult to distinguish between concessions 
and public contracts.4 Out of the twenty-six CJEU rulings on concessions since 
the Telaustria landmark judgment5 in 2000, thirteen rulings concerned the 
energy, transport and postal services sectors, OJ L 134, 30 April 2004, p. 1. Direc-
tive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 
coordinating of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply 
contracts and public service contracts, OJ L 134, 30 April 2004, p. 114.
4 Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC define concessions as contracts of pecuni-
ary interest concluded between one or more economic operators and one or more 
contracting authorities or entities and having as their object the acquisition of 
works or services where the consideration consists, normally, in the right to exploit 
the works or services that are the subject of the contract. The execution of these 
works or services is subject to specific binding obligations defined by contracting 
authority or entity which are legally enforceable.
5 Case C-324/98, Telaustria vand Telefonadress v Telekom Austria, [2000] ECR I-10754, 
where the Court stated that the contracting authorities need to comply with the 
TFEU principles of equal treatment and transparency when awarding concession 
contracts.
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clarification of the notion of concession. The majority of these cases stemmed 
from requests by national courts for a preliminary ruling, reflecting their re-
current uncertainties or, sometimes, lack of understanding of the concept of 
concessions.
The Commission provided some clarity in this respect in its interpretative 
Communication6, explaining that the risk inherent in the exploitation of the 
work or service which the concessionaire has to bear is the essential feature 
of a concession. Although the case law of the CJEU shed some more light on 
this definition, fundamental elements, such as the level and types of risk, still 
remained unclear.7 
There was also some uncertainty regarding the distinction between works 
concessions and service concessions.8 Since most works concessions also in-
volve, to a certain extent, the provision of services, and as it is not always easy 
to ascertain what the main purpose of the contract was, certain works conces-
sions were awarded as service concessions, thus unduly avoiding the applica-
tion of the secondary EU rules.
Uncertainty existed also with regard to the obligations of the contracting 
authorities or contracting entities9 to apply TFEU principles of transparency, 
equal treatment and non- discrimination when awarding concession contracts. 
Although the CJEU confirmed in Telaustria that the contracting entities 
which award concessions are bound to comply with the fundamental rules of 
the TFEU, it did not sufficiently explain the content of those rules. Besides, it 
is not easy to judge the adequacy of measures aimed at ensuring compliance 
with the principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency.
6 Commission interpretative communication on concessions under Community law 
(OJ C 121, 29 April 2000), pp. 2–13, point 2.1.1.
7 See infra, point 3.
8 See cases C-331/92, Gestion Hotelera International SA v Comunidada Autonomia de 
Canarias SA, [1994] ECR I-01329 and C-220/05 Jean Auroux and Others v Commune 
de Roanne, [2007] ECR I-00385, points 36-37.
9 The contracting entities are regulated in the Article 7 of the Concessions Directive. 
Those are entities which pursue one of the activities referred to in Annex II (see 
infra footnote 26) of that Directive and award a concession for the pursuit of one 
of those activities and which are one of the following: state, regional or local au-
thorities, bodies governed by public law or associations formed by one or more such 
authorities or one or more such bodies governed by public law, public undertakings, 
entities other than those, but which operate on the basis of special or exclusive 
rights, granted for the exercise of one of the activities referred to in Annex II.
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The problem of uncertainty regarding the applicable rules has also been 
identified in the case of contract modification. Many stakeholders have iden-
tified this issue as an important one. Although the case-law of the CJEU ap-
plicable to modifications of public contracts also applies to concessions, the 
level of certainty provided by these judgments does not seem to be adequate.
The lack of legal certainty increases the risks and costs of cancellation or 
early termination of illegally awarded contracts10 and ultimately prevents con-
tracting entities from using concessions where this type of contract might be 
a good solution. This may have the effect of reducing the uptake of private 
enterprises, resulting in missed opportunities for engaging private investments 
and know-how.11 
The another important consequence of legal vacuum in the field of the 
award of concession contracts are barriers to entry into the concession markets 
stemming from a divergence of national regimes, but also from unlawful prac-
tices of contracting entities due to the lack of clarity of EU rules.
Divergent national rules on concession generate costs related to legal advice 
and the need to acquire knowledge of specific national or even regional and 
local rules on the award of concession contracts. Divergent national rules on 
concessions which create barriers to entry or delay entry into the markets of 
Member States, in particular for small and medium-size enterprises, put in-
cumbent national enterprises at a significant advantage. In that way the mar-
ket stays fragmented and the rate of cross-border provision of services remains 
limited. This effectively means that EU citizens may not be benefiting from 
quality services at the best prices.
One of the fundamental problems in regard to entry barriers stemming 
from unlawful practice is the direct award of concession contracts with a cross-
border interest. Direct awards originate from inadequate application of the 
principle of transparency, either by national lawmakers or by contracting en-
tities. Direct awards have particularly negative consequences for the proper 
functioning of the internal market of the EU. With reference to the port sec-
tor, where concessions are widespread, the results from a survey conducted by 
the Institute of Transport and Maritime Management and the University of 
10 In case C-503/04, Commission v Germany, [2007] ECR I-6153 the Court ruled that 
a contract awarded in breach of EU law must be terminated, see point 33.
11 This is particularly the case in new Member States, where uncertainty is compoun-
ded by a lack of experience.
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Antwerp for the European Seaport Organisation (ESPO) show that 14 % of the 
respondents declared they had directly awarded contracts for port services.12
Another unlawful practice concerns the award of public contracts in accor-
dance with lenient rules applicable to concessions (undermining the effecti-
veness of public procurement rules). Aditionally, concessions are granted as 
licences or authorisations (usually encompassing exclusive rights), which is 
a breach of the TFEU principles.13 There is also evidence (with regard to the 
port sector, for instance) that the granting of concessions as licences or aut-
horisations under conditions of non-existent or insufficient competition leads 
to higher prices and a reduced quality of the services provided to contracting 
entities and consumers, while excluding economic operators from the relevant 
markets.
Finally, the consultations of the Commission with the steakholders indicate 
that the lack of clear rules also leads to unlawful use of non-objective selection 
and award criteria. This is the case when objectives unrelated to the subject 
mater of the contract are included in the evaluation of the best offer.14 
In order to solve problems connected with award of concession contracts 
the European Commission issued interpretative communications on concessi-
ons on two occasions15 but neither of those documents achieved the desired 
12 The sectors of port services and waste treatment, but also water distribution, waste 
water and sewage, transport, energy, car parking and airport services seemed to be 
particularly affected by this practice. See Commission Staff Working Document, 
Impact Assessment of an Initiative on Concessions, SEC (2011) 1588 final, Brussels, 20 
December 2011, p. 17. 
13 In those cases a concession contract is wrongly qualified as a unilateral act which 
may be granted without a competitive procedure. Although the CJEU ruled that the 
granting of a licence encompassing an exclusive right had to comply with the princi-
ples of equal treatment and transparency, it also allowed for quite a wide derogation 
from these principles, excluding from this transparency obligation licences granted 
to: (1) public operators subject to direct State supervision or (2) private operators 
subject to strict control by the public authorities, see case C- 203/2008, Sporting 
Exchange Ltd. trading as Betfair v Minister van Justitie, [2010] ECR I-4659, point 59.
14 For instance, contracting entities may want to take into account tenderers’ social 
commitments not related to the subject matter of the contract or relations of trust 
with one of the bidders.
15 The aim of the interpretative communication is to give instructions for interpreta-
tion and application of EU law. It summarises and explains the ways in which 
certain regulations of EU law should be interpreted, taking account of the case law. 
It is a political document which is not legally binding for anyone but the European 
Commission, who adopted it. See Commission interpretative communication on 
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results. That confirmed the need for adopting new legislation in that field. 
Between May and July 2010 the Commission held an online consultation 
open to the general public, and another in August and September 2010 tar-
geting the business community, social partners and contracting entities. The 
consultations confirmed that the lack of legal certainty caused problems and 
demonstrated the obstacles that companies face with regard to market access. 
They also suggested that appropriate EU action should be taken. In that light 
the European Commission submitted to the European Parliament and to the 
Council on the 20th of December 2011 a proposal for the adoption of the 
Concessions Directive. After a coordination of those two institutions the final 
version of the Concessions Directive was adopted more than two years later, 
on the 26th of February 2014 , and published in the Official Journal of the EU 
on the 28th of March 2014.16
3. THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF THE CONCESSIONS DI-
RECTIVE
In this paper we will analyse the most important elements of the Concessi-
ons Directive which are peculiar to this type of contract. These are:
1. A clear and precise definition of concession based on the CJEU case law. 
The definition contained in Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC made it 
difficult to distinguish between concessions and some other public agreements, 
especially public contracts, authorisation and licences. Recitals of the Conces-
sions Directive provide clarification on this point.17 As it is explained, while 
concessions are contracts for the procurement of works or services, licences 
and authorisations are acts whereby the State or a public authority establishes 
the conditions for the exercise of an economic activity, without providing for 
specific and enforceable commitments by the economic operator. The latter 
do not qualify as concessions and for that reason their grant is not covered 
by the Concessions Directive but rather by the Services Directive (Directive 
the application of Community law on Public Procurement and Concessions to In-
stitutionalised Public-Private Partnerships (IPPP), COM (2007) 6661, Brussels, 
5 February 2008 and another Communication on concessions cited supra in the 
footnote 6.
16 Directive 2014/23/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 Febru-
ary 2014 on the award of concession contracts, OJ L 94, 28 March 2014, p. 1
17 See recitals 14 and 15.
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2006/123/EC).18 Similarly, rent or lease agreements will not be considered 
concessions if the consideration for using land or infrastructure by a private 
operator does not encompass the provision of specific works of services. 
The lack of a clear and precise definition of concession has given rise to a 
significant number of judgements of the CJEU but they did not clarify the no-
tion of concession because certain fundamental elements, such as the level and 
types of risk that is transferred to the concessionaire, still remained unclear.19 
The Concessions Directive finally clarifies the definition of concession in 
particular by referring to the concept of substantial operating risk.20 The main 
feature of a concession, the right to exploit works or services, always implies the 
transfer to the concessionaire of an economic risk involving the possibility that it 
will not recoup the investments made and costs incurred in operating the works 
or services awarded. In that sense, operating risk is defined in the Concessions 
Directive as a risk in exploiting works or services provided by concessionaire 
which includes demand or supply risk or both. The concessionaire shall be dee-
med to assume operating risk where, under normal operating conditions, it is 
not guaranteed that he will recoup the investments made or the costs incurred in 
operating the works or the services which are the subject-matter of the concessi-
on. The part of the risk transferred to the concessionaire involves real exposure 
to the vagaries of the market, such that any potential estimated loss incurred 
by the concessionaire must not be merely nominal or negligible.21 An operating 
18 Directive 2006/123/EC of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal matket, OJ 
L 376, 27 December 2006, p. 36. 
19 In this matter case law is not sufficiently clear, in particular regarding the level of 
operating risk and categories of that risk to be transferred to the economic opera-
tor so that a contract can qualify as a concession. While demand risk for services 
seems to be widely accepted as relevant for the definition of a concession, there is 
uncertainty in regard to other categories of risk (availability, construction, legal and 
political, etc.). See judgments in cases C-437/07, Commission v Italy [2008] I-00153 
i C-300/07, Hans & Christophorus Oymanns GbR v AOK Rheinland [2009], ECR 
I-04779 and C-206/08, WAZV Gotha v Eurawasser Aufbereitungs und Entsorgungsgese-
llschaft mbH, [2009] ECR I-08377.
20 Demand risk is to be understood as the risk on actual demand for the works or 
services which are the object of the contract. Supply risk is to be understood as the 
risk on the provision of the works or services which are the object of the contract, 
in particular the risk that the provision of the services will not match demand. For 
the purpose of assessment of the operating risk the net present value of all the in-
vestment, costs and revenues of the concessionaire should be taken into account in 
a consistent and uniform manner.
21 See Article 5 of the Concessions Directive.
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risk should stem from factors which are outside the control of the parties. Risks 
such as those linked to bad management, contractual defaults by the economic 
operator or to instances of force majeure are not decisive for the purpose of 
classification as a concession, since those risks are inherent in every contract, 
whether it be a public procurement contract or a concession.
2. Coverage of works and services concessions both in the utilities sector22 
and in the classic sector (all sectors not covered by utilities). Works concession 
are contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writing by means of which 
one or more contracting authorities or contracting entities entrust the execu-
tion of works to one or more economic operators, the consideration for which 
consists either solely in the right to exploit the works that are the subject of 
the contract or in that right together with payment. On the other hand, ser-
vices concession means a contract for pecuniary interest concluded in writing 
by means of which one or more contracting authorities or contracting entities 
entrust the provision and the management of services to one or more econo-
mic operators, the consideration of which consists either solely in the right to 
exploit the services that are the subject of the contract or in that right together 
with payment.
During negotiations on the Concessions Directive, the Commission tried to 
make clear at every stage that the Directive does not aim at the privatisation 
of any services, and reassured citizens that services, in particular water, will 
not be privatised. Despite all the changes to the legal text, and the contribu-
tions from all political parties in the European Parliament and the Council, 
the text was not satisfactory for anyone; it did not provide the reassurances 
that citizens expected and it potentially brought about a fragmentation in the 
internal market of the EU with regard to this specific sector. That is why the 
best solution appeared to be to remove water from the scope of the Directive, 
which was done.23 
22 The utilities sector in general includes water, energy, transport and postal services, 
but in case of Concessions Directive the water services were excluded from its scope.
23 The scope of the Directive also excluded ambulance services performed by non-
profit organisations or associations, but not patient transport ambulance services 
performed by those organisations or associations. Also, the Concessions Directive 
does not affect the freedom of Member States to choose, in accordance with EU 
law, methods for organising and controlling the operation of gambling and betting, 
including by means of authorisations. Operation of lotteries can be awarded by a 
Member State to an economic operator on the basis of an exclusive right granted by 
means of a procedure without publicity pursuant to applicable national laws, regu-
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3. In order to ensure transparency and equal treatment to all economic ope-
rators Concessions Directive provides for obligation for contracting authorities 
and contracting entities to publish concession notices in the Official Journal of 
the EU, when their value is equal to or greater than a threshold prescribed in 
that Directive.24 The latter ensures, for the benefit of any potential tenderer a 
degree of advertising sufficient to enable the services market to be opened up 
to competition and the impartiality of the procedures to be reviewed.
The Concessions Directive will apply only to concession contracts whose 
value is equal to or greater than the threshold prescribed in that Directive, 
which reflects the clear cross-border interest of concessions to economic ope-
rators located in Member States, other than that of the contracting authority 
or contracting entity. Consequently, the method of calculating the estimated 
value of a concession is set out, and is identical for works and services conce-
ssions, as both contracts often cover elements of works and services. The value 
of a concession represents the total turnover of the concessionaire generated 
over the duration of the contract, net of value-added tax, as estimated by the 
contracting authority or the contracting entity, in consideration for the works 
and services being the object of the concession, as well as for the supplies in-
cidental to such works and services. That estimate is valid at the moment at 
which the concession notice is sent or, in cases where such notice is not provi-
ded for, at the moment at which the contracting authority or the contracting 
entity commences the concession award procedure, for instance by contacting 
economic operators in relation to the concessions.
4. An adequate solution for dealing with changes to concessions contracts 
during their term, especially when they are justified by unforeseen circumstan-
ces.
The Concessions Directive has no retroactive effect. Concession contracts 
in place at the time of its entry into force will not be affected for their entire 
duration. However, an extension of their duration or any other substantial mo-
dification may qualify as a new concession and therefore will have to comply 
with the rules of the new Concessions Directive. 
lations or published administrative provisions in accordance with the TFEU. That 
exclusion is justified by the granting of an exclusive right to an economic operator, 
making a competitive procedure inapplicable, as well as by the need to retain the 
possibility for Member States to regulate the gambling sector at national level in 
view of their obligations in terms of protecting public and social order.
24 That threshold is € 5 186 000.
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The Directive clarifies, in line with the case-law of the CJEU, the notion 
of a substantial modification of a contract during its term.25 It also stipulates 
when a modification can be made without a new award procedure.
In particular, it provides for an exemption from the obligation to apply a 
new procedure for the award of concession for minor changes to the contract 
(those not exceeding the threshold laid down in the Directive of € 5 186 000 
and inferior to 10 % of the price of the initial contract) which will always be 
acceptable. It also clarifies the scope of acceptable contractual clauses and sets 
out the conditions for modification in case of unforeseen circumstances and 
necessity to award additional works or services. 
In that sense, the Concessions Directive prescribes that concessions may be 
modified without a new concession award procedure in any of the following 
cases: a) where the modifications, irrespective of their monetary value, have 
been provided for in the initial concession documents in clear, precise and 
unequivocal review clauses, which may include value revision clauses, or opti-
ons; b) for additional works or services by the original concessionaire that have 
become necessary and that were not included in the initial concession where 
a change of concessionaire: cannot be made for economic or technical reasons 
such as requirements of interchangeability or interoperability with existing 
equipment, services or installations procured under the initial concession; and 
would cause significant inconvenience or substantial duplication of costs for 
the contracting authority or contracting entity. However, in the case of con-
cessions awarded by a contracting authority, for the purposes of pursuing an 
activity other than those referred to in Annex II of the Concessions Directive26, 
25 A modification of a concession during its term shall be considered to be substantial 
where it renders the concession materially different in character from the one initially 
concluded. In any event a modification shall be considered to be substantial where 
one or more of the following conditions is met: a) the modification introduces condi-
tions which, had they been part of the initial concession award procedure, would have 
allowed for the admission of applicants other than those initially selected or for the 
acceptance of a tender other than that originally accepted or would have attracted ad-
ditional participants in the concession award procedure; b) the modification changes 
the economic balance of the concession in favour of the concessionaire in a manner 
which was not provided for in the initial concession; c) the modification extends the 
scope of the concession considerably; d) where a new concessionaire replaces the one 
to which the contracting authority or contracting entity had initially awarded the 
concession. See Article 43 paragraph 4 of the Concessions Directive.
26 Those are services connected with providing gas, heat and electricity, activities re-
lating to the provision or operation of networks providing a service to the public in 
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any increase in value shall not exceed 50 % of the value of the original conce-
ssion; c) where all of the following conditions are fulfilled: the need for modi-
fication has been brought about by circumstances which a diligent contracting 
authority or contracting entity could not foresee; the modification does not 
alter the overall nature of the concession; in the case of concessions awarded 
by contracting authority, for the purposes of pursuing an activity other than 
those referred to in Annex II of the Concessions Directive, any increase in 
value is not higher than 50 % of the value of the initial concession;27 d) where 
a new concessionaire replaces the one to which the contracting authority or 
the contracting entity had initially awarded the concession as a consequence 
of either: an unequivocal review clause or option in conformity with point (a); 
universal or partial succession into the position of the initial concessionaire, 
following corporate restructuring, including takeover, merger, acquisition or 
insolvency, of another economic operator that fulfils the criteria for qualitati-
ve selection initially established provided that this does not entail other sub-
stantial modifications to the contract and is not aimed at circumventing the 
application of this Directive; or in the event that the contracting authority or 
contracting entity itself assumes the main concessionaire’s obligations towards 
its subcontractors where this possibility is provided for under national legisla-
tion; e) where the modifications, irrespective of their value, are not substantial 
within the meaning of paragraph 4 of the Article 43 of the Concessions Direc-
tive (supra, footnote 25).
Furthermore, and without any need to verify whether the conditions set 
out under points (a) to (d) of paragraph 4 of Article 43 are met28, concessions 
may equally be modified without a new concession award procedure in accor-
dance with the Concessions Directive where the value of the modification 
is below both of the following values: the threshold set out in Article 8 of € 
5 186 000; and 10 % of the value of the initial concession.
the field of transport by railway, automated systems, tramway, trolley bus, bus or 
cable, activities relating to the exploitation of a geographical area for the purpose of 
the provision of airports and maritime or inland ports or other terminal facilities to 
carriers by air, sea or inland waterway, activities relating to the provision of postal 
services, activities relating to the exploitation of a geographical area for the purpose 
of extracting oil or gas, coal or other solid fuels.
27 Where several successive modifications are made, this limitation shall apply to the 
value of each modification. Such consecutive modifications shall not be aimed at 
circumventing this Directive.
28 See footnote 25.
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However, the modification may not alter the overall nature of the concessi-
on. Where several successive modifications are made, the value shall be asse-
ssed on the basis of the net cumulative value of the successive modifications.
5. Establishment of certain obligations with respect to the selection and 
award criteria to be followed by entities awarding concessions. These rules aim 
at ensuring that such criteria are published in advance, are objective and non-
discriminatory. They are less restrictive than similar provisions applicable to 
public contracts. However, they restrict the selection criteria to those that are 
appropriate to ensure that a candidate or tenderer has the legal and financial 
capacities and commercial and technical abilities to perform the concession to 
be awarded. The Concessions Directive stipulates that all requirements must be 
related and strictly proportionate to the subject-matter of the contract, taking 
into account the need to ensure genuine competition. Also, concessions should 
not be awarded to economic operators that have participated in a criminal orga-
nisation or have been found guilty of corruption, fraud to the detriment of the 
EU financial interests, terrorist offences, money laundering, terrorist financing 
or trafficking in human beings. Member States should, however, be able to pro-
vide for a derogation from these mandatory exclusions in exceptional situations 
where overriding requirements in the general interest make a contract award 
indispensable. Non-payment of taxes or social security contributions should also 
be sanctioned by mandatory exclusion at the level of the EU.
Contracting authorities or contracting entities may exclude or may be requ-
ired by a Member State to exclude from participation in a concession award 
any economic operator which has proven unreliable, for instance because of 
serious or repeated violations of environmental or social obligations, including 
rules on accessibility for disabled persons or other forms of grave professional 
misconduct, such as violations of competition rules or of intellectual proper-
ty rights.29 It is also stipulated that contracting authorities and contracting 
entities should remain free to consider that there has been grave professional 
misconduct, where, before a final and binding decision on the presence of 
mandatory exclusion grounds has been rendered, they can demonstrate by 
any appropriate means that an economic operator has violated its obligations, 
including obligations relating to the payment of taxes or social security contri-
29 Grave professional misconduct can render an economic operator’s integrity ques-
tionable and thus render the economic operator unsuitable to receive the award of a 
concession contract irrespective of whether the economic operator would otherwise 
have the technical and economical capacity to perform the contract.
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butions, unless otherwise provided by national law.30 Contracting authorities 
and contracting entities should also be able to exclude candidates or tenderers 
whose performance in earlier concessions or other contracts with contracting 
authorities or contracting entities has shown major deficiencies with regard to 
substantive requirements, for instance failure to deliver or perform, significant 
shortcomings of the product or service delivered, making it unusable for the 
intended purpose, or misbehaviour that casts serious doubts as to the relia-
bility of the economic operator. National law should provide for a maximum 
duration for such exclusions.
On the other hand, award criteria should ensure compliance with the prin-
ciples of transparency, non-discrimination and equal treatment and that ten-
ders are assessed in conditions of effective competition permitting to identify 
an overall economic advantage for the contracting authority or the contracting 
entity. They may include, inter alia, environmental, social or innovation-rela-
ted criteria.31 These criteria should prevent arbitrary decisions by contracting 
authorities and contracting entities and must be published in advance and 
listed in descending order of importance. 32 When a contracting authority or 
30 Contracting authority or contracting entity is responsible for the consequences of 
possible erroneous decisions.
31 With a view to the better integration of social and environmental considerations in 
the concession award procedures, contracting authorities or contracting entities 
should be allowed to use award criteria or concession performance conditions relat-
ing to the works or services to be provided under the concession contract in any 
respect and at any stage of their life cycles from extraction of raw materials for the 
product to the stage of disposal of the product, including factors involved in the 
specific process of production, provision or trading of those works or services. Cri-
teria and conditions referring to a production or provision process are for example 
that services being the object of the concession are provided using energy-efficient 
machines. In accordance with the case-law of the CJEU, this also includes award 
criteria or concession performance conditions relating to the utilisation of fair trade 
products in the course of the performance of the concession to be awarded. Crite-
ria and conditions relating to trading and its conditions can for instance refer the 
requirement to pay a minimum price and price premium to subcontractors. Con-
cession performance conditions pertaining to environmental considerations might 
include, for example, waste minimisation or resource efficiency.
32 “The most economically advantageous tender” criterion for the award of concessions 
is not mentioned in this Directive because the Commission deems that the use of 
that criterion, in most cases, does not permit to take into account the complexity 
of concession contracts. The Commission also alleges that criteria prescribed in the 
Concessions Directive put more emphasis on quality, environmental considerations, 
social issues and innovation, putting an end to the dictatorship of the lowest price.
B. Bulum, M. Pijaca, M. Vokić Žužul: Directive 2014/23/EU on the Award of Concession...324
contracting entity receive a tender which proposes an innovative solution with 
an exceptional level of functional performance which could not have been fore-
seen by a diligent contracting authority or contracting entity, the contracting 
authority or contracting entity may, exceptionally, modify the ranking order of 
the award criteria to take into account that innovative solution. In that case, 
the contracting authority or the contracting entity shall inform all tenderers 
about the modification of the order of importance and shall issue a new invi-
tation to submit tenders.
6. No standard mandatory award procedures (negotiations are always po-
ssible) but instead establishment of certain general guarantees aimed at en-
suring transparency and equal treatment (notably, in case of negotiations). 
These guarantees aim at ensuring that the process is fair and transparent. This 
solution allows Member States to prescribe more flexible procedures for awar-
ding concessions notably reflecting national legal traditions and permitting the 
award process to be organised in the most efficient way.
7. Application of the Remedies Directives (Directives 89/665/EEC and 
92/13/EC, as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC)33 to all concessions covered 
by the Concessions Directive guarantee effective channels for challenging the 
award decision in court and provide minimal judicial standards which have to 
be observed by contracting authorities or entities.
Before bringing the Concessions Directive, concession contracts falling 
outside of the scope of the Classic Directive on procurement were not covered 
by the Remedies Directives. Hence, tenderers do not benefit from an adequ-
ate system guaranteeing effective enforcement of TFEU principles. Although 
some Member States (such as France, Portugal and Romania) extended the 
application of the Remedies Directives to service concessions, a number of 
other (Germany, UK, Sweden and Netherlands, for instance) have not done 
33 Council Directive 89/665/EEC of 21 December 1989, on the coordination of laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions relating to the application of review pro-
cedures to the award of public supply and public works contracts, OJ L 395, 30 
December 1989, p. 33. Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992, on the 
coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the ap-
plication of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operat-
ing in the water, energy, transport and telecommunication sectors, OJ L 395, 30 
December 1989, p. 33. Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 December 2007 amending Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 
92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures con-
cerning the award of public contracts, OJ L 335, 2 December 2007, p. 31.
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so.34 It follows that some important guarantees provided for by the Remedies 
Directives (such as the obligation to abstain from concluding a contract be-
fore the expiry of the standstill period or the conditions for ineffectiveness of 
concessions awarded directly) are not available in many Member States. As a 
result, potential violation of the TFEU principles cannot be adequately tackled 
by the aggrieved economic operators. 
4. APPLICATION OF THE CONCESSIONS DIRECTIVE IN THE      
FIELD OF MARITIME CABOTAGE CONTRACTS
Contracts on the provision of maritime cabotage35 services are qualified as 
service concessions and are, consequently, subject to the application of the 
Concessions Directive.
When the competent authority of a Member State concludes a public ser-
vice contract, it has to respect the applicable procurement rules. As we menti-
oned above (supra point 2), on the 26th of February 2014 the Council and the 
European Parliament adopted a new Directive on the award of service conce-
ssion contracts (Concessions Directive). On the same date, the Council and 
the European Parliament also adopted Directive 2014/24/EU and Directive 
2014/25/EU (Public Procurement Directives).36
34 In an online consultation which was organised by the European Commission 24.9 % 
of the respondents considered that national rules did not offer effective remedies to 
all parties wishing to challenge decisions awarding service concessions.
35 Maritime transport services within a Member State (maritime cabotage) mean ser-
vices normally provided for remuneration and in particular include: 
 (a) mainland cabotage: the carriage of passengers or goods by sea between ports 
situated on the mainland or the main territory of one and the same Member State 
without calls at islands; 
 (b) off-shore supply services: the carriage of passengers or goods by sea between any 
port in a Member State and installations or structures situated on the continental 
shelf of that Member State; 
 (c) island cabotage: the carriage of passengers or goods by sea between: 
 - ports situated on the mainland and on one or more of the islands of one and the 
same Member State, 
 - ports situated on the islands of one and the same Member State.
36 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 Febru-
ary 2014 on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC, OJ L 94, 28 
March 2014, p. 65; Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC 
OJ L, 28 March 2014, p. 243.
B. Bulum, M. Pijaca, M. Vokić Žužul: Directive 2014/23/EU on the Award of Concession...326
Most of public service contracts awarded in the application of Article 4 
of the Regulation 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide ser-
vices to maritime transport within Member States (Cabotage Regulation)37 
constitute service concessions within the meaning of the public procurement 
legislation. Consequently, public service contracts on the provision of mari-
time cabotage services are qualified as service concessions and are subject to 
the application of the Concessions Directive. Therefore, Concessions Directive 
applies as lex generalis to those issues related to the conclusion and execution 
of the public contracts on providing maritime cabotage services, which are not 
regulated with the Cabotage Regulation. 
 In particular, by means of such contract the competent authority entrusts 
the provision of the maritime cabotage service to a shipowner for a certain 
period of time. The shipowner is obliged to provide the transport service stipu-
lated in the contract, usually against a financial compensation by the author-
ity. The shipowner, in principle, bears the operating risk (if this is not the 
case, such a contract qualifies as a public contract in the meaning of the Public 
Procurement Directives), encompassing the risk related to the demand for his 
transport services, since the competent authorities usually do not guarantee 
in the public service contract that the shipowner would recoup all the invest-
ments made or the costs incurred in performing his contractual obligations.
For the award of public service contracts falling within the scope of the 
Concessions Directive the competent authority must treat all shipowners equ-
ally and without discrimination and is required to act in a transparent and 
proportionate manner in order to ensure genuine competition. Moreover, the 
Directive lays down, among other things, an obligation to publish the conce-
ssion notice and the relevant contract award notice in the Official Journal of the 
European Union.38 It also establishes a number of obligations with respect to the 
37 Regulation No 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to 
maritime transport within Member States (maritime cabotage), OJ L 364, 12 De-
cember 1992., p. 7. 1. Member State may conclude public service contracts with or impose 
public service obligations as a condition for the provision of cabotage services, on shipping 
companies participating in regular services to, from and between islands. Whenever a Member 
State concludes public service contracts or imposes public service obligations, it shall do so on 
a non-discriminatory basis in respect of all Community shipowners. 2. In imposing public 
service obligations, Member States shall be limited to requirements concerning ports to be 
served, regularity, continuity, frequency, capacity to provide the service, rates to be charged and 
manning of the vessel. Where applicable, any compensation for public service obligations must 
be available to all Community shipowners. 3. Existing public service contracts may remain in 
force up to the expiry date of the relevant contract. (Article 4 of the Cabotage Regulation).
38 Articles 31-33 of the Concessions Directive.
Zbornik PFZ, 66, (2-3) 309-333 (2016) 327
selection and award criteria and sets out procedural guarantees aimed at ensu-
ring transparency and equal treatment, notably during negotiations between 
the competent authority and tenderers.39
The Cabotage Regulation does not set any maximum duration for public 
service contracts. However, it follows from Article 1 and Article 4 of that Re-
gulation that public service contracts should have a limited duration in order 
to allow regular and open functioning of the market, hereof the Concessions 
Directive is applied on that issue with the view to determine maximum dura-
tion of cabotage contracts.
If a public service contract is a concession, according to Article 18 of Con-
cessions Directive concerning contracts with a duration greater than five years, 
the maximum duration of the concession must not exceed the time that a concessi-
onaire could reasonably be expected to take to recoup the investments made in operating 
the works or services together with a return on invested capital taking into account the 
investments required to achieve the specific contractual objectives.
With a view to complying with the principle of proportionality in any mar-
ket intervention, Member States should choose the least distortional means, 
also in terms of duration, to meet the essential maritime transport needs. All 
EU shipowners should be regularly given the opportunity to apply for the ope-
ration of a cabotage service.
In its interpretative Communication of 2003 the Commission indicated 
that a public service contract of a period of more than six years does not nor-
mally meet the proportionality requirement.
However, the Commission’s experience since 2003 has shown that in some 
cases the six-year limit puts shipowners off bidding as they consider this dura-
tion to be too short to recoup the investments in the operation of the service. 
Moreover, public authorities also claim that contracts of short duration might 
discourage shipowners from making more substantial investments, thus ham-
pering innovation and possible improvements in the quality of the service. 
For this reason the Commission believes that public service contracts la-
sting more than five (in case the contract is a concession within the meaning of 
Concessions Directive) or six years can meet the proportionality requirement 
provided that (1) they are justified by objective criteria, such as the need to 
39 In cases of contracts below the thresholds for the application of Concessions Direc-
tive a selection and award procedure is nonetheless required to meet the TFEU 
requirements of non-discrimination and equal treatment that imply an obligation 
of transparency.
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recoup the investments made in operating the maritime cabotage service under 
normal operating conditions (e.g. investments in vessels or infrastructure) (2) 
and that they do not lead to market foreclosure. 
According to the Commission’s experience and the information provided 
by the public authorities, contracts of a maximum duration of 12 years could 
be justified in order to enable the depreciation of a significant part of costs 
of an average new ferry, while allowing the proper functioning of the market. 
In the Commission’s opinion contracts of a significantly longer duration (e.g. 
which would allow the full amortisation of a new vessel with a return on the 
invested capital) could hinder competition on the maritime cabotage market. 
Procedures for concluding public service contracts in the maritime sector 
may be over-complicated when it comes to organising services for small islan-
ds, which normally only attract local operators, so in that case simplified rules 
are applied.
Cabotage Regulation does not provide for a definition of small islands. A 
study carried out on behalf of the Commission40, shows that small islands 
could be understood to mean islands where the total annual number of pass-
engers carried by sea to and from the island is around 300 000 or fewer.41 The 
Commission takes the view that, the selection of a suitable operator entrusted 
to serve a small island could be carried out following a simple call for expressi-
ons of interest without launching a formal tender, provided that a Union-wide 
announcement of the service, which is very easily organised, is maintained. 
The Commission also takes the view that a longer duration of contracts, of 12 
years, might be acceptable.
5. APPLICATION OF THE CONCESSIONS DIRECTIVE IN THE FIELD 
OF CONTRACTS ON PROVIDING PORT SERVICES
In the field of award of contracts on providing port services42 the Conce-
ssions Directive also applies as lex generalis. This stems from the Proposal for a 
40 ICF Consulting, Study on Small Islands and Estuaries, 2002.
41 The threshold of 300 000 passengers refers to a one-way count, i.e. a passenger 
travelling to the island and back counts twice.
42 The proposed Regulation apply to the provision of the following categories of port 
services, either inside the port area or on the waterway access to and from the ports: 
(a) bunkering; (b) cargo handling;(c) dredging;(d) mooring;(e) passenger services;(f) 
port reception facilities; (g) pilotage and;(h) towage. For more on those issues see 
Bulum, B., Usluge pomorskog prijevoza i lučke djalatnosti u pravu tržišnog natjecanja Eu-
ropske zajednice, Zagreb, Inmag, 2010.
Zbornik PFZ, 66, (2-3) 309-333 (2016) 329
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council (hereinafter: Pro-
posal) establishing a framework on market access to port services and financial 
transparency of ports.43 That Proposal refers in the preamble and in several 
provisions to the Concessions Directive. 
In the preamble of the Proposal it is stated that its provisions will not be 
imposed on cargo handling services and terminal passenger services because 
these services are often organised by means of concession contracts and for 
that reason fall within the scope of the Concessions Directive. It is explained 
that additional legal provisions on the award of provision of those services 
could undermine efforts being made to initiate a Social Dialogue at the Union 
level.44 
Article 7 of the Proposal which regulates the procedure for the limitation of 
the number of providers of port services prescribes that any limitation of the 
number of providers for a port service must follow a selection procedure which 
should be open to all interested parties, non-discriminatory and transparent. 
If the estimated value of the port service exceeds the threshold defined in 
the Concessions Directive the rules on the award procedure, the procedural 
guarantees and the maximum duration of the concessions as set out in the 
Concessions Directive apply. The threshold and the method to determine the 
value of the port service must be those of the relevant and applicable provisi-
ons of the Concessions Directive. It is also prescribed that, for the purposes 
of the proposed Regulation establishing a framework on market access to port 
services and financial transparency of ports, a substantial modification within 
the meaning of the Concessions Directive of the provisions of a port service 
contract during its term must be considered as a new port service contract and 
requires a new award procedure.
It is evident that the Concessions Directive has a very important role when 
it comes to the provision of port services because two kinds of such services 
(the cargo handling services and the terminal passenger services) completely 
fall within the scope of the Concessions Directive, and some important issues, 
such as determination of the value of the port service and substantial modi-
fication of a port service contract during its term, are also regulated with the 
Concessions Directive.
43 Co-decision procedure between European Parliament and the Council with regard 
to this Proposal is still ongoing. See COM (2013) 296. 
44 Member States remain free to decide to apply nevertheless the rules of the proposed 
Regulation to these two services.
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6. CONCLUSION
After it was established that the legal vacuum that had existed in the area 
of the award of concession contracts could not be filled by the case law of the 
European Courts, competent institutions of the EU started to work on Euro-
pean legislation in that area. As a result of that, the Concessions Directive was 
adopted in February 2014, almoust four years after the European Commission 
started public consultations on the award of concession contracts.
With the Concessions Directive the TFEU principles, in particular the prin-
ciples of free movement of goods, freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services, as well as the principles deriving from those principles, such 
as equal treatment, non-discrimination, mutual recognition, proportionality 
and transparency, become more concrete because it prescribes enforceable ob-
ligations and rights for all parties that participate in the process of award of 
concession contracts, and in that way influences the improvement of legal 
certainty and the creation of an internal market of the EU in that field.
The Concessions Directive finally clarifies the definition of concession in 
particular by referring to the concept of substantial operating risk. Operating 
risk is defined in the Concessions Directive as risk in exploiting works or ser-
vices provided by the concessionaire which includes demand or supply risk or 
both. The concessionaire is deemed to assume an operating risk where, under 
normal operating conditions, it is not guaranteed to recoup the investments 
made or the costs incurred in operating the works or the services which are 
the subject-matter of the concession. The part of the risk transferred to the 
concessionaire involves real exposure to the vagaries of the market, such that 
any potential estimated loss incurred by the concessionaire must not be merely 
nominal or negligible. 
A very important novelty is that the Concessions Directive regulates works 
concessions and also services concessions both in the utilities sector and in the 
classic sector. 
In order to ensure transparency and equal treatment for all economic ope-
rators the Concessions Directive provides for an obligation for contracting aut-
horities and contracting entities to publish concession notices in the Official 
Journal of the EU, when their value is equal to or greater than the threshold 
prescribed in that Directive. The latter ensures, for the benefit of any potential 
tenderer, a degree of advertising sufficient to enable the services market to be 
opened up to competition and the impartiality of the procedures to be reviewed.
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The Concessions Directive has no retroactive effect. Concession contracts 
in place at the time of its entry into force will not be affected for their entire 
duration. However, an extension of their duration or any other substantial 
modification may qualify as a new concession and therefore will have to com-
ply with the rules of the new Concessions Directive. The Directive clarifies, in 
line with the case law of the CJEU, a notion of a substantial modification of 
a contract during its term. It also stipulates when a modification can be made 
without a new award procedure.
Additionally, the Directive imposes certain obligations with respect to the 
selection and award criteria to be followed by entities awarding concessions. 
These rules aim at ensuring that such criteria are published in advance, are 
objective and non-discriminatory. They are less restrictive than similar provisi-
ons applicable to public contracts. However, they restrict the selection criteria 
to those that are appropriate to ensure that a candidate or tenderer has the 
legal and financial capacities and commercial and technical abilities to per-
form the concession to be awarded. Also, all requirements shall be related and 
strictly proportionate to the subject-matter of the contract, taking into acco-
unt the need to ensure genuine competition. The Directive does not prescribe 
any standard mandatory award procedures (negotiations are always possible) 
but instead establishes certain general guarantees aimed at ensuring transpa-
rency and equal treatment (notably, in case of negotiations). These guarantees 
aim at ensuring that the process is fair and transparent. This solution allows 
Member States to prescribe more flexible procedures for awarding concessions 
notably reflecting national legal traditions and permitting the award process to 
be organised in the most efficient way.
 Before the adoption of the Concessions Directive, concession contracts 
falling outside the scope of the Classic Directive on procurement (Directive 
2004/18/EC) were not covered by the Remedies Directives (Directives 89/665/
EEC and 92/13/EC, as amended by Directive 2007/66/EC). Hence, tenderers 
do not benefit from an adequate system guaranteeing effective enforcement of 
TFEU principles.
The Concessions Directive extends the scope of the Remedies Directives to 
all concessions covered by the Concessions Directive. That guarantees effective 
channels for challenging the award decision in court and provide minimal judi-
cial standards which have to be observed by contracting authorities or entities.
In the field of award of contract on the provision of maritime cabotage 
services Concessions Directive applies as lex generalis on those issues related to 
B. Bulum, M. Pijaca, M. Vokić Žužul: Directive 2014/23/EU on the Award of Concession...332
the conclusion and execution of the public service contracts on providing mari-
time cabotage services which are not regulated by the Cabotage Regulation. 
The most important issue is duration of those public contracts. The Cabotage 
Regulation does not set any maximum duration for public service contracts on 
providing maritime cabotage services. However, those public service contracts 
should have a limited duration in order to allow regular and open functioning 
of the market, hereof the Concessions Directive is applied on that issue with 
the view to determine maximum duration of cabotage contracts.
If a public service contract is a concession, according to Article 18 of the 
Concessions Directive in case of contracts with a duration greater than five 
years, the maximum duration of the concession must not exceed the time that a 
concessionaire could reasonably be expected to take to recoup the investments made in ope-
rating the works or services together with a return on invested capital taking into account 
the investments required to achieve the specific contractual objectives. According to the 
Commission’s experience and the information provided by the public autho-
rities, contracts of a maximum duration of 12 years could be justified in order 
to enable the depreciation of a significant part of costs of an average new ferry, 
while allowing the proper functioning of the market. In the Commission’s 
opinion contracts of a significantly longer duration (e.g. which would allow 
full amortisation of a new vessel with a return on the invested capital) could 
hinder competition on the maritime cabotage market. The Commission also 
takes the view that in case of small islands a longer duration of contracts, of 
12 years, might be acceptable.45
It is evident and it stems from the Proposal for a Regulation establishing 
a framework on market access to port services and financial transparency of 
ports that the Concessions Directive has a very important role when it comes 
to the provision of port services, because two kinds of such services (the cargo 
handling services and the terminal passenger services) completely fall within 
the scope of the Concessions Directive, and some important issues, such as 
determination of the value of the port service and substantial modification of 
a port service contract during its term, are also regulated with the Concessions 
Directive. 
45 See Communication from the Commission on the interpretation of Council Regula-
tion No 3577/92 applying the principle of freedom to provide services to maritime 
transport within Member States (maritime cabotage) of 22 April 2014, COM(2014) 
232, p. 19.
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DIREKTIVA EUROPSKE UNIJE O DODJELI UGOVORA O 
KONCESIJI I NJEZINA PRIMJENA NA UGOVORE U SEGMENTU 
POMORSKOG PRIJEVOZA
Na području dodjele ugovora o koncesiji postojala je pravna praznina koju su 
europski sudovi nastojali razriješiti pojašnjavanjem određenih pitanja povezanih uz 
dodjelu ugovora o koncesiji u okviru dvadeset i šest presuda na tom području koje su 
donijeli od 2000. godine do danas. Ipak, stanje na području dodjele ugovora o koncesiji 
bilo je daleko od zadovoljavajućeg. To je uputilo nadležne institucije Europske unije na 
činjenicu da se probleme povezane uz dodjelu ugovora o koncesiji ne može rješavati od 
slučaja do slučaja te da je potrebno donošenje europskih pravila na tom području. Tako 
je početkom 2014. godine donesena Direktiva Europskog parlamenta i Vijeća o dodjeli 
ugovora o koncesiji.
U ovom radu analiziramo temeljne elemente te Direktive, kao što su precizna 
definicija koncesija, obvezno objavljivanje obavijesti o dodjeli koncesije u Službenom 
listu Europske unije u propisanim slučajevima, utvrđivanje određenih obveza u vezi 
s kriterijima za odabir i dodjelu koncesije koje tijela koja dodjeljuju koncesiju moraju 
poštovati, reguliranje izmjena koncesija za vrijeme njihova trajanja itd.
U radu je također napravljena kritička analiza primjene Direktive o dodjeli ugovora 
o koncesiji u segmentu pomorskog prijevoza, posebice na području dodjele ugovora o 
pružanju usluga pomorske kabotaže i ugovora o pružanju lučkih usluga koji se smatraju 
koncesijama za pružanje usluga te su, u tom smislu, podložni primjeni Direktive o dodjeli 
ugovora o koncesiji.
Ključne riječi: ugovori o koncesiji, Direktiva o dodjeli ugovora o koncesiji, pomorska 
kabotaža, ugovori o pružanju usluga pomorske kabotaže, lučke usluge, ugovori o pružanju 
lučkih usluga
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***  Dr. sc. Marina Vokić Žužul, znanstvena suradnica Jadranskog zavoda Hrvatske 
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